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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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TO: S/S - Mr. [redacted]
FROM: EA - Winthrop G. Brown
SUBJECT: Draft Instruction to Warsaw for Meeting with Chinese

Attached is a redraft of a proposed instruction to the vessel which was discussed in the Secretary's office this afternoon.

To facilitate any changes that may be desired while this is still in draft each paragraph is on a separate sheet.

Copies have been furnished to Under Secretary Johnson, Messrs. Green, Davis and Swank. I would prefer to have their comments before sending it in to the Secretary, but I am furnishing you with this copy in case he should wish to see it right away.

I attach also a draft memorandum from the Secretary to the President pointing out the items in this message which we consider to break new ground in our talks with the Chinese.

We may wish to add a sub-paragraph under 12 to cover the likely contingency that the Chinese may attack our cooperation with Japan as aggression.

Attachments:

1. Draft Instruction
2. Draft Memorandum to the President

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SUBJECT: Guidance for 135th Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting

1. U.S. opening statement is designed to set atmosphere for future meetings. In consonance with guidance given you for January 8 meeting, emphasis is on a new beginning in our relationship and our hope that ideological differences will not stand in way of progress on concrete state-to-state relations. While we anticipate Chinese will come primarily to listen, they will undoubtedly feel constrained to raise at minimum questions of alleged U.S. occupation of Taiwan and charges of U.S. air and sea intrusions. You should avoid being drawn into ~~polemic~~ polemics, but should feel free to probe and inquire into any constructive statements Chinese may make. Text of opening statement follows with unnecessary words omitted.

QUOTE INTRODUCTION

2. Mr. Charge d'affaires. Today marks first opportunity for both of us to represent our respective governments in this formal series of Ambassadorial-level meetings. In our informal conversations December 11 and January 8, however, I described to you the general spirit with which President Nixon has instructed me to approach this meeting today. I observed that the US wished to improve relations between our two countries, that it did not seek to stand in the way of

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from China or to join in any condominium with the Soviet Union directed against China. It is my Government's hope that today will mark a new beginning in our relationship. We hope that, in a spirit of flexibility, we can both take a fresh and constructive look at whole range of possibilities for improvement of relations between our two countries. We hope to explore what practical steps we can take to eliminate many of barriers to understandings from which our two countries could mutually benefit. We do not deny that there are serious differences between our two Governments. But we believe that we should make every effort possible to overcome these and that it should be possible to make progress in this effort.

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U.S. Posture in Asia

3. During his Asian visit last year, President Nixon made it clear that, as the countries of Southeast Asia became better able to assume burden of own defense, United States presence in Asia would be reduced, and that while U.S. intends to honor its commitments, in final analysis, responsibility for each nation's viability could be borne only by that nation itself.

4. The U.S. has no intention of attempting, either unilaterally or in concert with others, to exclude People's Republic of China from developing normal, friendly relations with its Asian neighbors and pursuing its own legitimate national interests in this area. We do not believe that your Government intends to undertake overt aggression against other Asian countries. Nevertheless, my Government cannot ignore the expressions of concern voiced by Southeast Asian states at what they consider interference in their internal affairs by other countries. It is in this sense that I believe that whatever constructive contribution your Government can make toward reaching just and equitable peace in the area and in easing legitimate concerns of other Asian governments would contribute toward more rapid achievement of goal I think we both seek: reduced American military presence along southern border of China and reduction of military tension in area.

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Proposals for Improved Contacts

5. We are prepared to discuss with you any proposals designed improve relations and reduce tensions between our two countries. These might include agreements on trade, renunciation of use of force, and matters related to disarmament. Other subjects for discussion might be exchange of reporters, scholars, scientists and scientific information. As recently as November 25, 1968, your proposal for resumption of these meetings referred to desirability of concluding agreement on five principles of peaceful coexistence. There may be other topics your Government would like to propose. Those I have mentioned are all specific areas in which we feel that early and meaningful progress can be achieved. Perhaps even more important, however, is achievement through our frank discussions at these meetings of understanding between our two Governments on our objectives in Asia, their limits, and our mutual acceptance of fact that improvement in our relations serves interests of both our countries. It is my Government's sincere belief substantive political dialogue can and should be significant contribution toward this goal.

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Trade

6. Since coming to office in January 1969, President Nixon has taken several actions that give concrete expression to our hope that barriers to normal intercourse between our two peoples can gradually be lowered. On July 21 of last year my Government eased its regulations on travel to People's Republic of China and amended its long standing trade restraints. On December 19 a further and more significant amendment of our trade controls was announced. We now prepared, should you be interested, to discuss whole question of trade between our two countries and settlement of outstanding debts and obligations.

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Taiwan

7. Mr. Charge d'Affaires. Without doubt, ^{the} single most complex problem existing between our two sides is ^{the} question of Taiwan and United States relationship with Republic of China. The United States will continue to maintain its friendly relations with the Government, ^{on Taiwan} and honor its commitment to that Government to assist it in defending Taiwan and the Pescadores from military attack. However, US position in this regard is without prejudice to any future peaceful settlement between the Government in Taipei on Taiwan and your Government. I can assure you, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, that US does not seek to impose its own views concerning Taiwan on either side, and we do not intend to interfere in whatever settlement may be reached. Our only concern is that this issue not be resolved by force of arms. In this same spirit we will not support and will strongly oppose any offensive military action from Taiwan against mainland. Limited US military presence on Taiwan is not threat to security of your Government, and it our hope that as peace and stability in Asia grow we can reduce those facilities on Taiwan that we now have.

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Disarmament

8. Mr. Charge' d'Affaires. Problem of controlling weapons of mass destruction is vital question for peoples of every country. Thus far, for example, agreement has been reached on a partial nuclear test ban treaty and on agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been signed by 93 nations. On October 25 of last year US and Soviet Union announced decision commence talks on strategic arms limitation. These important actions are not designed to perpetuate nuclear monopoly of US and Soviet Union or to threaten any other country. I made it abundantly clear in my statement^{to you} of January 8, and US has stated as clearly as possible publicly, that it does not intend to interfere in disputes of others or seek to gain advantage from them. We think strategic arms limitation is matter of vital concern to welfare of both our peoples and would welcome an expression of interest on part of your Government in ~~commencing~~ commencing bilateral discussions between our two governments on subject.

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Prisoners

9. Mr. Charge d'Affaires. My Government and people of US welcomed release December 7 of Bessie Hope Donald and Simeon Baldwin who inadvertently entered Chinese claimed territorial waters while sailing from Hong Kong to Macau. There remains, however, long-standing question of remaining Americans being held in prison by your authorities. Anyone familiar with American people of all political views will agree that question of US citizens imprisoned or missing in China is one of great concern to them. Forward movement on this issue, through release of those now held or, at minimum, through identification of those held and permission for visits by family members, would be constructive move toward restoration of improved relations between our two countries.

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10. My Government would be prepared to send a special representative to Peking, or to have a special representative from your Government come to Washington to discuss any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today.

Conclusion

11. In closing, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, I would like to restate once again my Government's hope that regular contacts can take place at frequent intervals and that these talks will enable us to move toward new phase in Sino-American relations based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence.

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12. In responding to issues we anticipate Chinese will raise, you should draw on following points:

a. Taiwan

In response to charges that U.S. occupying Taiwan, you should simply reiterate remarks in opening statement, (para 8) stressing that limited U.S. military installations not intended as threat to China and hope that as peace and stability in Asia grow we can reduce those facilities we now have there.

b. Air and Sea Intrusions

In reply to charges that U.S. aircraft and ships have intruded into China's territorial airspace and waters and that they have harassed and strafed Chinese fishermen, you should point out that we had made careful investigation of each of their charges, and in nearly every case we have found that there was a difference of information on exact circumstances of alleged intrusion or incident. Remind them that we have proposed procedure for joint investigation of these incidents and state we still feel this would be best way to avoid these misunderstandings. In any event we have taken number of steps designed to minimize accidental encounters or intrusions.

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c. Peaceful Coexistence

If Chinese propose reaching agreement on five principles of peaceful coexistence as suggested in their November 25, 1968 note to us, you should probe for as many details as possible, indicate our general desire for progress toward peaceful coexistence, and indicate that you will transmit their proposal to your Government.

d. U.S. -Soviet Collusion

Chinese may raise charges of U.S. -Soviet collusion on disarmament and other matters. You should deny charges and emphasize that we seek to improve relations with all states, including Soviets and People's Republic of China. We do not support Brezhnev doctrine re intervention in Socialist states or Soviet collective security plan, nor do we seek to capitalize on Sino-Soviet differences. We intend to push ahead on arms limitations with the Soviet Union because it has indicated willingness to do so. We would welcome a similar expression of interest from People's Republic of China.

e. Viet-Nam

Unlikely Chinese will dwell at length on Vietnam and you should avoid being drawn into polemics on subject. Reiterate remarks from opening statement.

13. EA/ACA Director Kreisberg and Donald Anderson will join as advisor and interpreter respectively for meeting.

GP-1.

End.

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Guidance for Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting,
January 20, 1970

I enclose the guidance prepared for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the 135th Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw, January 20, 1970. The message contains the text of Ambassador Stoessel's opening presentation as well as general guidance for responses to issues we believe the Chinese are likely to raise. The emphasis is on a new beginning in Sino-U.S. relations and this Administration's new approach to Asian policy.

Among the points not previously raised with the Chinese are:

1. Guam Doctrine. Although this has been amply spelled out in public statements, we think it important convey it privately to the Chinese along with its implications for improvement in our bilateral relations.

2. U.S. assumption that the People's Republic of China does not intend to undertake overt aggression against other Asian states. We think this useful to dispel earlier characterizations of China as a potential aggressor and threat to its Asian neighbors.

3. The "goal we both seek", a reduced U.S. military presence along China's southern border. This is intended to make clear to the Chinese that we do not seek a permanent military presence on the Asian mainland and that China can best ease her own security worries over U.S. "encirclement" through cooperating in a reduction in tension in the area around her southern border.

4. Offer to discuss both our goals in the area and their limits.

Although, in a sense, the Warsaw talks have centered around mutual discussion and accusation concerning each other's goals in Asia, we have never proposed that we undertake a genuine dialogue on this subject, particularly concerning the limits of our objectives.

5. Offer to discuss the whole range of trade questions including the settlement of outstanding obligations. It is unlikely the Chinese will want to enter into concrete trade discussions at this meeting. Nevertheless, we know that they are curious about our unilateral actions and may be interested in any expression of U.S. willingness to open this entire issue to discussion.

6. Three new formulations on Taiwan:

(a) The U.S. does not seek to impose its views concerning Taiwan on either side and does not intend to interfere in whatever settlement may be reached.

(b) A strengthened commitment not to support a GRC offensive action against the mainland.

(c) Expression of hope that we can reduce U.S. military presence on Taiwan as peace and stability in Asia grows. ^{PP} The issue of Taiwan is the key to any improvement of relations with the PRC and the Chinese will be most interested in our statements on this subject. These three formulations carry us about as far as we can go.

prepared to go at this time, but they are most important as a signal that we genuinely seek an improvement of relations.

7. Offer to enter bilateral discussions on disarmament.

This offer has the double advantage of enabling us to refute Chinese charges of U.S. -Soviet "collusion" on nuclear disarmament matters while indicating that we believe the Chinese to be a major power and an essential element in the disarmament picture.

8. Offer to send a special representative to Peking or have a Chinese representative come to Washington to discuss any of the subjects mentioned in the statement. Should the Chinese wish to signal their willingness to improve relations, they could accept this offer without compromising any of their principles. Acceptance of such an offer at present is unlikely, but they will find it interesting as evidence of U.S. interest in further development of relations.